

Research Article

The Impact of Nuclear Power on Pakistan: Analyzing the Recipients of U.S. Aid, Efficacy, and Future Consequences

Aftab Ahmad ^a

Abstract: This study examines the United States' imposition of sanctions on Pakistan following the test of nuclear arsenals in 1998. The paper examines the elements that contribute to lifting U.S. sanctions on Islamabad and evaluates the effectiveness of imposing consistently strong economic penalties. It analyses the manner in which the United States employed Pakistan to serve its national security objectives by offering assistance in a counterterrorism effort spearheaded by the United States following the events of 9/11. The United States, driven by its own self-interests, chose to support Pakistan by easing sanctions and sending help. Pakistan, in turn, used this aid for military and general development goals. This study analyses the cost-effectiveness of U.S. aid and the disparity between internal and foreign opinions of the recipients of U.S. help in Pakistan. The primary aim of this article is to evaluate Pakistan's utilization of U.S. aid, specifically in terms of military expenditures against investments in the well-being of its people. This assessment will consider viewpoints from both internal and international sources. Within this framework, the study offers several recommendations that have significant ramifications for the donor-beneficiary approach to aid provision and budget allocation in the future.

Keywords: Pakistan, U.S. aid, Sanctions, Future Consequences

Introduction

Economic sanctions refer to deliberate actions taken by governments to withdraw or threaten to withdraw financial connections or customary trade. Customary trade refers to the levels of trade and financial activities that would probably have occurred in the absence of sanctions. A Sender state seeks to inflict financial harm on a Target state by limiting its exports, restricting imports, or impeding financial transactions, including freezing or confiscating assets of the target state. The emergence of Pakistan as a nuclear state in 1998 posed concerns to the national security interests of the United States (Ahmed, 2000). In reaction to Pakistan's nuclear testing, the United States promptly implemented sanctions. Nevertheless, the sanctions were gradually diminished by the resumption of trade and other initiatives, as stipulated in the President's "Relief Act". When conflicts are resolved and policies shift from coercion to collaboration, effectively lifting sanctions requires more than just providing relief. The events of September 11, 2001, prompted a re-evaluation of American foreign policy objectives, leading to a reformulation of policies towards Pakistan (Gordon, 2001). Upon assessing the national security concerns of the United States, it acknowledged Pakistan's assistance in combating terrorism through the provision of financial and military assistance. From an economic perspective, the global transfer is typically perceived as advantageous for the recipient state while detrimental to the donor state. Foreign aid is commonly perceived as a humane strategy, a political and security investment, or a form of compensation for liberalizing trade, notwithstanding the financial cost involved. Foreign aid is the provision of financial resources, technical support, and goods to other countries, with the aim of advancing the interests of either the donor or recipient state. The aid is provided to either a governmental entity or individuals residing inside that jurisdiction. This support falls into one of the three categories: humanitarian aid, development assistance, and security assistance. Developed states adhere to this approach by offering financial help or foreign aid to developing or impoverished states (Lancaster, 2000).

Pakistan successfully mitigated the potential adverse consequences of sanctions both prior to and during its acquisition of nuclear capabilities. In order to safeguard its national security equilibrium with

^a M.Phil. Scholar, Department of Pakistan Studies, Allama Iqbal Open, University, Islamabad, Pakistan.

India, Pakistan had to ensure its own security. India, a nuclear power in South Asia, has often issued threats to Pakistan regarding potential attacks. Pakistan conducted nuclear weapons tests in response to the imminent threat. U.S. trade sanctions on Islamabad following the nuclear test were ineffective. The events of 9/11 resulted in the intertwining of security concerns and the assistance supplied by the U.S., which played a subordinate role in the process of lifting bans on Pakistan (Rafique, [2002](#)). Consequently, the United States lifted the sanctions imposed on Pakistan and provided additional military assistance to combat terrorism in Afghanistan. In 2008, civilian governments prioritized allocating aid towards short-term development expenses in order to garner support for their electoral goals (Greene et al., [2018](#)). They failed to assist the military in improving its domestic financial situation by decreasing its expenses. From a national standpoint, the United States has allocated monies to Pakistan as compensation for the use of military bases since 2001. According to U.S. experts, Pakistan employs a two-fold strategy by combating Taliban elements within its own borders while appearing to engage in conflict in Afghanistan. This approach serves Pakistan's own goals in Afghanistan and hinders India's influence in Pakistan, its adversary. Furthermore, the provision of U.S. aid for socio-economic development failed to enhance the well-being of individuals and alleviate poverty, as it weakened civil society and bolstered the military through military assistance. Experts concur that the United States, driven by its own self-interests, chose to support Pakistan by relaxing sanctions and providing help. Additionally, Pakistan was able to allocate a portion of the funding towards the construction and growth of its military. Following the 9/11 attacks, the United States has employed various economic instruments such as targeted trade measures, lifting sanctions in conjunction with providing loans to incentivize allies and imposing fresh sanctions to deter adversaries. Furthermore, this sanctions programme is being implemented as both a deterrent and an incentive.

Pakistan's Nuclearization and U.S. Sanctions

Several sender states impose economic penalties on target states in order to accomplish their intended objectives. The effectiveness of penalties relies on the objectives determined by the sender state. The underlying principle of sanctions aims to achieve compliance from the sending state by creating a deterrent effect. However, this approach is effective only when the sender state enforces penalties with unwavering conviction, leaving no room for the target state to evade the adverse consequences. The Realists' assertion regarding the worldview is based on four assumptions: firstly, the primary goal of every nation is survival; secondly, states are rational actors; thirdly, each country possesses military capabilities and faces uncertainty regarding its neighbouring states; and fourthly, countries with significant economic and military strength hold decisive power. India and Pakistan have refused to join the deal due to allegations of discriminatory practices, as the "big five" countries - U.S., China, France, UK, and Russia - justify their possession of nuclear weapons while prohibiting other nations from developing them. This stance, set against the backdrop of the unsettled border dispute between them, keeps the other states alert to any prospective intensification. Pakistan embarked on its nuclear endeavours in 1955, leveraging the 'Atoms for Peace' programme started by U.S. President Dwight D. (Gattie et al., [2020](#)). Eisenhower primarily focused on peaceful objectives. As part of this initiative, Pakistan signed a collaboration agreement. The United States slapped sanctions on Pakistan following its nuclear tests in 1998 (Iqbal, 2021). In addition, Pakistan encountered the enforcement of Section 102 (b) of the 'Arms Export Control Act'. The Clinton administration reinstated the restrictions in order to compel Pakistan to halt their activities. The U.S. State Department provided a comprehensive explanation of the sanctions imposed on Pakistan and India on June 18, 1998. The purpose of these sanctions was to send a clear message to both countries that possess nuclear capabilities. The message emphasized the importance of Pakistan signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), refraining from using nuclear weapons, adhering to limitations on sharing weapons with other states, and reducing tensions surrounding the Kashmir issue between the two countries (Walker, 1998). Pakistan relinquished its policy of nuclear ambivalence, which it had adopted in the 1980s, by conducting a series of nuclear tests. Pakistan adhered to this strategy by refraining from both renouncing and acquiring nuclear weapons for overt weaponization.

The military, civil administration and nuclear experts reached the decision. In the aftermath of the military coup in 1999, the United States imposed a prohibition on the sale of military equipment and financial assistance to Pakistan. However, they did permit the sale of agricultural products and provided loans and

financing for educational initiatives. The Arms Export Control Act was enforced by the Pakistan Ministry of Defence, Space and Atmospheric Commission, and the National Development Complex in 2000. This was due to their importation of Chinese missile components and technology in the subsequent year. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 led to the implementation of legislative sanctions between 2017 and 2018, as reported by Panday in 2018. Despite repeated pressure from the U.S., President Trump took decisive action by suspending military assistance to Pakistan in recent years. According to his tweet, he expressed that the United States had imprudently provided Pakistan with over \$33 billion in assistance during the previous 15 years (Shepardson, [2018](#)). In return, they received nothing but falsehoods and dishonesty. The US-Pakistan relations indicate that the U.S. has imposed sanctions on Pakistan by halting economic and military aid over significant periods. The outcomes of sanctions demonstrate that Pakistan has not taken to sanctions severely. Pakistan was undeterred by threatening words, penalties, and sanctions in its pursuit of nuclear testing.

An Evaluation of the Efficacy of United States Sanctions on Pakistan

Sanctions are macroeconomic events that should be evaluated based on the economic damage they cause, especially to the specific socio-economic groups that bear the brunt of the loss. Numerous academics agree that sanctions are ineffective, yet they are imposed due to the scarcity of other options, such as discussions, conciliation, or conflict. This is true regardless of whether the possibility of military action is being considered or not. Sanctions function as prompt diplomatic measures, utilizing economic restrictions as a means to induce a target state to alter its political practices. Moreover, these are macroeconomic policies that shift coercive economic consequences from the sender state to the target state. From this standpoint, the efficacy of U.S. actions can be examined in the context of Pakistan. Pakistan was not deterred from conducting nuclear tests by the potential threat of U.S. sanctions, even though it could have imposed significant costs on Pakistan (Shaikh, [2002](#)). It is argued that the potential negative economic consequences of sanctions were outweighed by the fundamental national security interests at stake. It was anticipated that other states would not replicate the activities of the United States, and although some may imitate the course, their actions would be temporary due to political and philanthropic reasons. Pakistan needs to recognize that the U.S. is likely to impose sanctions if there is a nuclear explosion. The imposition of sanctions on Pakistan following nuclear testing has very insignificant adverse consequences compared to the potential benefits derived from this action (Akhtar, [2003](#)). From these conversations, it can be inferred that Pakistan did not exhibit significant apprehension towards the U.S. sanctions.

The efficacy of sanctions has diminished over time due to the increasing interconnectedness of the global economy, which has enabled targeted states to exploit international trade and finance markets and find other sources of goods and funding. Pakistan's increasing reliance on Iran and other Muslim nations as a means to avert potential economic and political decline. The CIA issued a warning in June 1998, stating that this dependence could lead to the proliferation of nuclear technology in Iran or other nations (Bahgat, [2006](#)). Additionally, it poses a detrimental impact on collaboration with the United States. Through an examination of the U.S. sanctions imposed on Pakistan, it is evident that the U.S. has been unsuccessful in its endeavours concerning Pakistan (Case 73-3) and (Case 79-2) due to Pakistan's execution of nuclear tests in 1998. The United States linked specific business transactions and foreign assistance to Pakistan in accordance with the 1994 Glenn Amendment to the U.S. Arms Export Control Act. In addition, the impact of U.S. sanctions on Pakistan (Case 99-3) was found to be insignificant. In order to diminish the incentive for nuclear proliferation, the President was required to terminate financial assistance and apply restrictions on exports, including agricultural products, to countries that conduct nuclear detonations. Therefore, the possibility of halting large grain exports to Pakistan led to the creation of a new law that granted the President the authority to exempt the Glenn Amendment for a period of one year.

Conversely, the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, unexpectedly created a strong urgency to remove sanctions on Pakistan (Smith, [2011](#)). Afghanistan presented itself as a strategically positioned country to actively pursue Osama Bin Laden, the primary suspect behind the attacks. As a response, the United States implemented actions such as offering financial assistance and deferring debts for Pakistan. President Bush revoked the three-year-old sanctions on Pakistan in order to safeguard American national security. It has

been suggested that Pakistan has offered support in terms of airspace and intelligence to the United States in their efforts to combat terrorism. President Bush stated that eliminating the sanctions would be a crucial step towards achieving our objectives with Pakistan, as it would provide support in the battle against terrorism. It is imperative that we promptly and decisively take measures to ensure our operational efficiency. In 2001, the United States removed sanctions against Pakistan in order to secure its collaboration in countering al-Qaida and the Taliban (Shah, [2007](#)). This action also helped to alleviate Pakistan's debt burden. Washington anticipated that those actions would assist President Pervez Musharraf in gaining political support for his controversial decision to aid Washington's efforts to eliminate Osama bin Laden (Tahir, [2011](#)). During the initial phase, there was a need for humanitarian assistance to help the Afghan victims and to demonstrate to the United States that it was not engaged in a conflict against Islam or the Afghan people. Since the commencement of military operations targeting Afghanistan, there has been a noticeable emergence of anti-American and anti-government sentiments in Pakistan. Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme is based on the traditional principle of nuclear deterrence, in which a weaker state can dissuade a more powerful adversary through the threat of retaliation or the use of atomic bombs.

Globally, it is widely acknowledged that the era of nuclear non-proliferation was influenced by the nuclear smuggling network led by Abdul Qadeer Khan, a Pakistani nuclear scientist. This network operated for over two decades until 2004, providing Iran and North Korea with nuclear technology, expertise, and plans. The U.S. administration, the British government, and other European powers allowed Pakistan to acquire restricted nuclear technology for a period of thirty years (Chinoy, [2021](#)). U.S. foreign policy in South Asia yielded multiple advantages due to its support for unattainable goals in the nuclear sphere. When analyzing the U.S. sanctions on Pakistan, it is widely believed that they were ineffective and ineffectual. Following the occurrence of 9/11, Pakistan has become the central point of the 'global antiterrorism campaign'. Pakistan's involvement will have a substantial impact on alliance efforts to combat the Taliban in Afghanistan and stabilize the country. The U.S. has made ineffectual efforts towards Pakistan. Economic sanctions are imposed on both countries, regardless of whether they are the ones imposing the penalties or the ones suffering from them. If economic sanctions are ineffective, they result in economic losses or disadvantages. In such instances, hostile nations often exploit the situation to develop diplomatic relations with countries that are under sanctions. Sanctions imposed by a solitary nation have the potential to be effective if there is a robust alliance among governments and international organizations that are capable of enforcing them. Therefore, the U.S. sanctions on Pakistan were ineffective.

Beneficiaries of U.S. Assistance in Pakistan

The United States seeks to maximize its investment by providing military aid, while Pakistan endeavours to secure both the interests of the United States and its own priorities. In the aftermath of the 9/11 incident, Pakistan's collaboration with the United States has caused social and political divisions among the Pakistani population, as well as destabilizing the country's economy and infrastructure (Akhtar, [2008](#)). Foreign aid is considered one of the significant advancements in modern foreign policy and is regarded as one of the founding principles in the study of international relations. The U.S. government classifies help into two distinct categories: military aid and economic aid. Pakistan is a recipient of both military and economic assistance. The U.S. populace is actively pursuing visible interests in order to provide assistance to Pakistan. Experts from many sources agree that Pakistan has not misused U.S. funding in accordance with the standards since 2001 (Ibrahim, [2009](#)). Pakistan seeks American support in addressing the challenges and preventing the state from being destabilized. In contrast, foreign experts concur that Pakistan has not efficiently utilized U.S. funding over the past twenty years. Pakistan can address this issue by enhancing it through collaborative efforts to reduce obstacles. Pakistan should refrain from any actions that could potentially indicate the diversion of aid towards nuclear activities in order to address U.S. concerns effectively (Kerr, [2010](#)).

It is imperative that humanitarian monies are not allocated to civilians in a lesser amount compared to the military budget. The analysis of U.S. aid to Pakistan reveals a specific emphasis on promoting economic growth during the 1950s and 1960s, with a special concentration on civilian economic support in the 1960s. In 1979, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the United States' resistance against the Soviets

encouraged the Pakistani military and intelligence organizations. USAID's provision of diverse development programmes, food assistance, and humanitarian aid had a crucial impact. From 1960 to 2002, Pakistan, a state reliant on aid, received a total of \$73.1 billion in foreign development assistance, which included funds from both bilateral and multilateral sources. Approximately 30% of the help was provided in the form of bilateral assistance from the United States. Pakistan's leadership, especially its military leadership, aligned itself with the United States during the Cold War. Between 1971 and 2001, Pakistan neither utilized U.S. assistance to achieve self-sustaining economic development nor accomplished U.S. objectives related to the Cold War, resulting in few advantages for the Pakistani public. Following the events of 9/11, the United States acquired Pakistan's collaboration in combating terrorism. Between 2002 and 2008, Pakistan allocated a mere 10% of its finances towards development projects, while a significant 75% was directed towards military expenditures (Zaidi, [2011](#)).

The primary objective of aid has been focused on counterterrorism rather than providing economic assistance. It is widely assumed that assistance was extended to combat terrorism following the 9/11 attacks. However, this aid did not contribute to military acquisitions; instead, it primarily facilitated self-effacing advancements in counterterrorism operations. The substantial military aid provided by the United States has bolstered Pakistan's robust military capabilities without providing significant support to the civilian government, democratic institutions, and the general population. In 2008, the United States redirected its assistance to Pakistan towards development by focusing on sustained involvement over an extended period of time. This adjustment was undertaken to align with the objectives and interests of both countries. The United States has provided financial aid to Pakistan, a neighbouring country of Afghanistan, in its capacity as an ally in counterterrorism efforts and to expel terrorist factions from Afghanistan. Pakistan was granted U.S. military and economic aid, ranking as the third-largest recipient among all states. From 2002 to 2018, the United States allocated around \$33.4 billion in economic assistance to Pakistan. Pakistan withheld the specifics on the allocation of funding. Government agencies from two nations have provided a significant amount of funding, around \$14.5 billion, to the Pakistani army in order to support its counterterrorism activities. Pakistan received the remaining \$18.8 billion as economic assistance. However, Pakistan has failed to convince the U.S. that it is effectively utilizing the aid in accordance with the given instructions. The presented expenses exceed the expenditures for routine operations.

The United States relies on the Pakistani military to secure Pakistan's western border and eradicate terrorists and extremists from their sanctuaries. The U.S. Congress and the public assert that Pakistan is failing to produce significant results in line with the help provided by the United States. No audits of financial expenditures have been conducted for a period of seventy-three years. The United States feels that the assistance provided to Pakistan has yielded minimal good outcomes. The United States gave help to the Pakistani army with the intention of supporting their efforts in the battle against terrorism but did not achieve the anticipated outcomes. Pakistan's civilian administration and military have encountered difficulties in combating domestic terrorism, resulting in limited achievements. Prior to 2009, this was regarded as a failure to promote and bolster democratic movements and institutions effectively (Downes et al., [2012](#)). Pakistani scholars contend that the country's economy relies heavily on remittances, in contrast to the assistance provided by the United States. They assert that U.S. aid has never amounted to more than 1% of the country's GDP. Pakistan contends that the United States' military campaign in Afghanistan has imposed substantial economic, social, and infrastructural burdens on Pakistan, amounting to approximately \$68 billion. Pakistan utilized U.S. military funding to get weaponry from the United States, with the intention of repaying the funds to the U.S. The United States refers to much CSF money as aid, but in reality, it is a form of indebtedness to Pakistan for its use of military infrastructure. The United States contends that Pakistan did not utilize the help in a manner that aligned with American interests and concerns. It consistently offered support in order to further its own goals by bolstering military dominance.

Furthermore, it provided economic assistance in order to cultivate a positive perception among the Pakistani populace. The disproportionate allocation of aid to Pakistan highlights its lack of effectiveness in attaining the intended goals. The lack of organized investment management leads to numerous drawbacks in funds expenditure for individuals and socio-political infrastructure. From a global standpoint, Pakistan has

provided support to the Taliban and terrorist organizations for an extended period of time, although the United States has not put sanctions on Pakistan similar to those imposed on North Korea (Khan, [2018](#)). A member of the National Security Council Secretariat, the United States has refrained from taking drastic measures because of Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons. The United States has expressed significant apprehensions over expenditure on aid since the previous decade. The Pakistani military and security services have not fulfilled their responsibilities as directed by the United States. The provision of U.S. cash has had a detrimental impact on the functioning of Pakistani institutions and the country's ability to combat extremist adversaries while also providing corrupt institutions with greater incentives for corruption. Considering the function of U.S. aid in Pakistan, it has shown to be unsuccessful due to the exorbitant operational expenses and insufficient amount of aid provided. Similarly, USAID programmes have faced obstacles due to insufficient funding and security considerations. Furthermore, crucial elements such as the absence of a consensus plan and ineffective mechanisms to monitor aid expenditure have not received adequate attention. Simultaneously, the Pakistani military did not employ aid specifically for counterterrorism objectives. However, there is no direct evidence of corruption within the Pakistani army. A thorough examination of the evidence shows that U.S. aid has provided significant humanitarian support to the Pakistani community, resulting in the preservation of lives and the provision of reassurance during times of calamities or pandemics. Developmental assistance facilitated the advancement of the state and its residents in economic, political, and social spheres. Security assistance advocated for the establishment of robust military and security forces. However, instead of providing monetary assistance, the U.S. offered technical expertise and commodities through collaborations with international and local organizations. U.S. aid to Pakistan has positively impacted American national security interests by supporting its allies in promoting regional and global peace.

Implication

An examination of the influence of nuclear power on Pakistan, with a specific focus on the beneficiaries of U.S. assistance, its effectiveness, and possible future outcomes, holds considerable significance. It highlights the complex interaction between nuclear capability, foreign aid, and geopolitical factors. The article raises awareness of the strategic aspects of international relations, emphasizing the pivotal role that nuclear power can play in influencing diplomatic alliances and the allocation of aid. Furthermore, it highlights the need to deal with security issues related to the spread of nuclear weapons, underscoring the necessity for efficient global systems to oversee and regulate the dissemination of nuclear technology. The results of this study have the potential to enhance the ongoing discussion on the complex interconnections among nuclear power, international aid, and the possible consequences for worldwide security.

Conclusion

Washington-Islamabad, though an alliance, has profited from nurturing and building relations as much as possible; state-to-state interactions and collaboration are arbitrary and insufficient. After testing nuclear weapons, U.S. sanctions on Pakistan were ineffectual on target states, suggesting other constructive approaches to engage them. The high-handed relaxation of sanctions to serve U.S. goals has increased mistrust and threat perception in mutual interactions. Post-9/11, US aid to Pakistan has concentrated on counterterrorism rather than population, economic, or democracy development. The U.S. thinks the Pakistani military will help fight terrorism, but both countries disagree. Because of unfounded trust in the Pakistani military, the U.S. offered help to it for engaging forcefully and successfully in political economy, bypassing elected civilian administration. U.S. funding to Pakistan has fluctuated over 70 years. The two nations' top concerns are Pakistan's nuclearization and its support for the U.S. in the battle against terrorism. Beneficiary-donor connections show that Pakistan helped the U.S. and its national objectives. Pakistan sought outside support during financial crises and for national security due to sanctions, withdrawal, or aid cutoffs. We recommend a balanced U.S. aid strategy for Pakistan. Decentralizing distribution and monitoring investment can offer funding for improving lives. The two countries would benefit from an agreed strategy and goals. U.S. aid should be used to promote democracy, infrastructure, and economic growth. Pakistani long-term development, stability, and prosperity are less important to the U.S. Long-term measures can improve US-

Pakistan relations. Both nations should cooperate on security and strengthen U.S. connections with the government, military, and people. The U.S. should provide possibilities for Pakistani youth through institutional support programmes. Domestic and international attitudes of Pakistani U.S. aid recipients differ. Though Pakistanis benefited from U.S. aid, they still dislike America. U.S. help has promoted Pakistan's social, political, and economic development. Aid benefited select upper-class groups, bureaucrats, and affluent people. It didn't reach the poor because it wasn't directly given to them. U.S. aid must be rethought and refocused for self-sustaining economic growth and constructive purposes. Pakistan may establish institutions with aid. Pakistani civilian governments have received less U.S. funding, and the military has been treated straight. Pakistan's hybrid military-civilian growth was maintained by policy and practice changes. The U.S. cares about Pakistanis, especially education development. This primary sector can improve income, living conditions, and poverty. U.S. funding for such interest will strengthen the two countries' ties.

References

- AHMED, S. (2000). Security Dilemmas of Nuclear-Armed Pakistan. *Third World Quarterly*, 21(5), 781–793. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3993618>
- Akhtar, N. (2008). PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, AND THE TALIBAN. *International Journal on World Peace*, 25(4), 49–73. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20752859>
- Akhtar, R. (2003). Nuclearization of Pakistan: Motivations and Intentions [Published master's thesis]. Eastern Illinois University.
- Bahgat, G. (2006). Nuclear Proliferation: The Islamic Republic of Iran. *International Studies Perspectives*, 7(2), 124–136. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/44218436>
- Chinoy, M. (2021, October 11). How Pakistan's A.Q. Khan helped North Korea get the bomb. *Foreign Policy*. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/11/aq-khan-pakistan-north-korea-nuclear/>
- Downes, A. B., & Sechser, T. S. (2012). The Illusion of Democratic Credibility. *International Organization*, 66(3), 457–489. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23279964>
- Gattie, D. K., & Massey, J. N. K. (2020). Twenty-First-Century U.S. Nuclear Power: A National Security Imperative. *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, 14(3), 121–142. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26937414>
- Gordon, P. H. (2001, November 1). September 11 and American foreign policy. *Brookings*. <https://brookings.edu/articles/september-11-and-american-foreign-policy/>
- Greene, Z. D., & Licht, A. A. (2018). Domestic Politics and Changes in Foreign Aid Allocation: The Role of Party Preferences. *Political Research Quarterly*, 71(2), 284–301. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26600473>
- Ibrahim, A. (2009, July). U.S. aid to Pakistan—U.S. taxpayers have funded Pakistani corruption. *Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs*. <https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/us-aid-pakistan-us-taxpayers-have-funded-pakistani-corruption>
- Iqbal, A. (2021, May 29). The cat-and-mouse game of U.S. sanctions on nuclear Pakistan. *DAWN.COM*. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1692054>
- Kerr, P. K. (2010). Pakistan's nuclear weapons: Proliferation and security issues. DIANE Publishing.
- Khan, S. (2018, September 20). Double game: Why Pakistan supports militants and resists U.S. pressure to stop. *Cato Institute*. <https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/double-game-why-pakistan-supports-militants-resists-us-pressure-stop>
- Lancaster, C. (2000). Redesigning Foreign Aid. *Foreign Affairs*, 79(5), 74–88. <https://doi.org/10.2307/20049889>
- Rafique, N. (2002). 9/11, A YEAR AFTER: APPRAISING US REGIONAL STRATEGIES. *Strategic Studies*, 22(3), 18–51. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/45242308>
- Shah, S. M. A. (2007). Pakistan and the War against Terrorism. *Pakistan Horizon*, 60(2), 85–107. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41500065>
- Shaikh, F. (2002). Pakistan's Nuclear Bomb: Beyond the Non-Proliferation Regime. *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, 78(1), 29–48. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3095973>
- Shepardson, D. (2018, June 3). Trump says U.S. has gotten 'nothing' from Pakistan aid. *reuters.com*. <https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN1EQ114/>
- Smith, P. J. (2011). The China—Pakistan—United States Strategic Triangle: From Cold War to the "War on Terrorism." *Asian Affairs*, 38(4), 197–220. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23526520>
- Tahir, M. (2011, July 22). Musharraf backs Pakistan's ISI. *RadioFreeEurope/Radioliberty*. <https://www.rferl.org/a/musharraf-defends-pakistan-spy-agency/24273182.html>
- Walker, W. (1998). International Nuclear Relations after the Indian and Pakistani Test Explosions. *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, 74(3), 505–528. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2624966>
- Zaidi, S. A. (2011). Who Benefits from U.S. Aid to Pakistan? *Economic and Political Weekly*, 46(32), 103–109. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23017764>